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Bazley v. Tortorich' made way for an avalanche of tort litigation
by employees who sustain injuries ordinarily covered by workers' com-
pensation, but under circumstances in which the injury is one resulting
from an allegedly intentional act of the employer or a co-employee. Bazley
filed suit against an unidentified co-employee truck driver and against the
driver of the car which ran into the garbage truck on which he was working,
resulting in Bazley's injuries. The trial court dismissed the action against
Bazley's co-employee as being barred by the worker's compensation
statute. The court of appeal reversed the trial court on that count,2 and
was in turn reversed by the supreme court which held that Bazley's
petition at best expressed a cause of action in negligence against his co-
employee and hence could not be maintained under the "intentional
act" exception to immunity under Section 1032.1
The supreme court opinion correctly stated that the meaning of
intent in the term intentional act is that the defendant either desired to
bring about the physical results of his act or believed they were sub-
stantially certain to follow from what he did. 4 The court properly
differentiated a voluntary act from an intentional one by saying that
"[tihe word act is used to denote an external manifestation of the actor's
will which produces consequences. There cannot be an act subjecting a
person to civil or criminal liability without volition."5
The supreme court opinion relies for its definitions upon Prosser 6
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and upon a comment to Title 14,
Section 8 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes. In relying upon those
authorities, the court wisely made instantly relevant the extensive jur-
isprudence and authority incorporated within those sources. In effect,
the court adopted a rich, voluminous, and instant legislative history.
The traditional intentional consequences, such as battery, have posed
no problem in the Louisiana jurisprudence in satisfying the requirements
of "intentional act." The door that has been opened wide consists of
the term "substantial certainty." What are the circumstances that would
fail to qualify as a traditional intentional harm, (defined as the desire
Copyright 1985, by Louisiana Law Review.
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1. 397 So. 2d 475 (La. 1981).
2. Bazley v. Tortorich, 380 So. 2d 727 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
3. La. R.S. 23:1032 (Supp. 1984).
4. 397 So. 2d at 481.
5. Id. (emphasis added).
6. W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 8, at 31 (4th ed. 1971).
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to bring about the physical results of the act) but would be found to
qualify under the "substantially certain" standard? What does the instant
legislative history tell us?
In explaining the meaning of intent, the comment to section 13 of
the Restatement, paragraph c provides that "it is immaterial that the
actor is not inspired by any personal hostility to the other, or desire
to injure him." 7 It is apparent that the physical consequences desired
are the contact with the person of another. If that desired contact is
consummated, then it is immaterial that no harm was intended if in
fact the contact does inflict harm. Prosser himself emphasizes this dis-
tinction when he says that the tort is complete even if there is "not
necessarily a hostile intent, or a desire to do any harm;" and it would
make no difference if the defendant "has honestly believed that he
would not injure the plaintiff .. *"8 Prosser went on further to say
that the word "intent" is the word "commonly used to describe the
desire to bring about the physical consequences, up to and including
the death . . . ."9 With the adoption of the Restatement-Prosser def-
inition of intent as including "substantially certain" it is therefore clearly
not required that the injury be desired, but only that the actor know
or believe that the injury will be substantially certain to follow as a
part of the physical consequences produced by the actor's conduct.
Is the standard of knowledge or belief objective or subjective? While
the Bazley opinion interchanges the terms "know" and "believe," 10
Prosser points out that where a reasonable man in defendant's position
would believe that a particular result would follow, he will be dealt
with by the court as though he had intended it." Thus, it seems that
Prosser advocates an objective standard for the knowledge or belief.
But in Fallo v. Tuboscope Inspection,'2 the supreme court specifically
rejected the proposition that the "should have known" test would satisfy
the state-of-mind element of the "substantially certain" standard. This
raises the perplexing problem of distinguishing among the terms "know,"
"believe," "should know," and "what a reasonable man would know,"
and of determining what evidence is required to satisfy each term when
it serves as an element of a burden of proof.
One is immediately aware that the cases defining the words "know"
and "believe" are so diverse as to require a treatise for synthesis alone.
Turning to conventional dictionaries, a fair consensus of the two def-
initions would be:
know: to have cognizance, consciousness, or awareness of; to
have within the mind as something apprehended, learned, or
7. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 13, comment c (1965).
8. W. Prosser, supra note 6, § 8, at 31.
9. Id.
10. 397 So. 2d at 481-82.
11. W. Prosser, supra note 6, § 8, at 32.
12. 444 So. 2d 621 (La. 1984).
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understood; to perceive directly to have direct unambiguous
cognition of.
believe: to accept or receive as genuine, valid or good; to be
of the opinion.
We are favored with a Restatement definition of "should know."
The words "should know" are used throughout the Restate-
ment of this Subject to denote the fact that a person of rea-
sonable prudence and intelligence or of the superior intelligence
of the actor would ascertain the fact in question in the per-
formance of his duty to another, or would govern his conduct
upon the assumption that such fact exists.' 3
"What a reasonable man would know" is set out at length by
Prosser as the foundation of negligence.1 4 It seems logical to incorporate
this analysis into Prosser's discussion of the meaning of intent when he
said "where a reasonable man in the defendant's position would believe
that a particular result was substantially certain to follow, he will be
dealt with by the jury, or even by the court, as though he had intended
it."' The knowledge that the law imputes to every reasonable man
would thus be the foundation, not for a finding of negligence, but for
a finding that a particular result was substantially certain to follow.
For example, every reasonable man would know that detonating a charge
of explosives will cause serious concussions, and if an individual is
nearby, it is substantially certain that he will be injured. The relevant
question then is whether it is acceptable judicial logic to hold that if
the reasonable man would know, then in the eyes of the law this
defendant did know.
How close does that reasoning move toward the "should have known"
standard? It moves very close but still leaves a gulf that perhaps cannot
be leaped without moving from intent to negligence. This leap would
be a difficult one pragmatically because of the long association of the
term with the negligence action. In another pragmatic sense, however,
a consideration of the evidence that would satisfy the requisite standard,
whether "know" or "should have known," may show that the gulf is
more illusory than real.
Even if actual knowledge or belief is required, such a state of mind
can be proved by circumstantial evidence; thus, even though an actor
on the witness stand denies passionately that he knew or believed that
certain consequences would follow from his act, circumstantial evidence
such as the observations of other witnesses, the defendant's prior ex-
perience, experience common to the community, common knowledge of
the physical properties of substances, and the probable consequences of
13. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 12(2) (1965).
14. W. Prosser, supra note 6, § 32, at 157.
15. Id., § 8, at 32.
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a chain of events could all be relevant in demonstrating that, despite
his denial, more probably than not he knew or believed that the con-
sequences were substantially certain to follow.
It is clear that no formal evidence need be introduced in proof of
matters of common knowledge or of those subject to judicial notice. 6
The attributes of the reasonable man and matters of common knowledge
may furnish a sufficient inferential base for the trier of fact to conclude
that the actor knew or believed with substantial certainty, as Prosser
observed. If this is true, then the practical difference at trial between
"know" and "should know" is very slight.
The difficulty of precisely defining the relationship between intent,
knowledge or belief of substantial certainty, and the physical conse-
quences (including injury), caused considerable consternation among the
practicing bar in the initial cases reported from the courts of appeal
on the issues of whether the pleadings presented a cause of action. A
number of cases were dismissed on the grounds that the allegations were
not factual but conclusory as to the necessary state of mind, whether
intent or substantial certainity, and therefore in contravention of our
procedural fact pleading requirements.17 Other opinions from the courts
of appeal analyzed pleadings and found them to be sufficient in this
respect.'" The Louisiana Supreme Court in Mayer v. Valentine Sugars,
Inc.'9 correctly pointed out that article 856 of the Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure provides that frame of mind can be alleged as such
without violating the Louisiana rule against conclusionary pleadings, so
that the words "substantial certainty" are sufficiently factual in stating
an actionable degree of probability approaching intent so as to satisfy
the requirements in that regard of the cause of action as stated in
Bazley.
Lastly, what degree of probability is contemplated by "substantial
certainty"? It is impractical to break the term down into a more specific
statement. The jury should therefore be charged with that term itself,
since its words communicate the notion of a high degree of probability. 20
16. McCormick on Evidence § 329 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
17. Buckbee v. Aweco, Inc., 418 So. 2d 698 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 422
So. 2d 166 (1982); Freeman v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 413 So. 2d 692 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1982); Shores v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 413 So. 2d 315 (3d Cir. 1982).
18. Quick v. Murphy Oil Co., 446 So. 2d 775 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 447
So. 2d 1074 (La. 1984); Weinnig v. Brown & Root, Inc., 428 So. 2d 1199 (La. App.
5th Cir.), cert. granted, 434 So. 2d 1099, reconsideration denied, 437 So. 2d 1136 (La.
1983); Hurst v. Massey, 411 So. 2d 622 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 413 So. 2d
900 (La. 1982).
19. 444 So. 2d 618 (La. 1984).
20. Bogard v. Cook, 586 F.2d 399, 411-12 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
883, 100 S. Ct. 173 (1979); Jackson v. Brantley, 378 So. 2d 1109 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979);
Vittum v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 117 N.H. 1, 3, 369 A.2d 184, 186 (1977); Com-
monwealth v. O'Searo, 466 Pa. 224, 352 A.2d 30, 37 (1976); Pachucki v. Republic Ins.
Co., 89 Wis. 2d 703, 707, 278 N.W.2d 898, 902 (1979).
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